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Abstract
Can a group be a standard rational agent? This would require the group to hold
aggregate preferences which maximise expected utility and change only by Bayesian
updating. Group rationality is possible, but the only preference aggregation rules
which support it (and are minimally Paretian and continuous) are the linear-geometric
rules, which combine individual tastes linearly and individual beliefs geometrically.
1 Introduction
Economics and other social sciences work with a well-established paradigm of a rational
agent. They routinely apply this paradigm to groups such as households, rms, govern-
ments, or entire societies. These group agents make decisions, form and revise plans,
engage in interactions, compete on markets, or entertain international relations. They
hold and revise preferences and beliefs in just the same rational way as individuals.
But is a rational group agent actually possible and meaningful, given heterogeneous
(rational) group members? That is, could any rational group agent emerge from com-
bining conicting attitudes of group members?
This problem is of obvious interest, but for two very di¤erent reasons. Firstly,
we aim for aggregational micro-foundations for the hypothesis of rational groups, to
legitimise our modelling practice. Working with rational groups without modelling
individuals is useful and convenient, but it would be comforting, to say the least, if
group agents could be interpreted as aggregations of (unmodelled) group members.
Secondly, we are sometimes explicitly interested in individuals, and need to combine
their attitudes into rational group attitudes, for instance in order to determine fair
group choices, which might be carried out by a group representative or planner. This
goal is constructive: we wish to build a rational group agent that respects some given
group members.
Existing aggregation theories provide powerful results that take us some way to-
wards a rational group. But they have never aimed for a full-edged rational group
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agent, to the best of my knowledge. For instance, Arrovian preference aggregation
ignores uncertainty, while Bayesian preference aggregation captures uncertainty, but
ignores the groups response to information. Our question is therefore alive: can a
group be a standard rational agent?
The theory of Bayesian preference aggregation o¤ers the right conceptual and formal
tools for addressing our question. This theory seeks to combine individual expected-
utility preferences under uncertainty. Perhaps surprisingly, this apparently static frame-
work has enough resources for studying the rational group in the full sense of orthodox
rationality, including the (neglected) dynamic dimension of group rationality, Bayesian
updating. But rst, what does this theory already teach us? If group members have
identical beliefs, combining their expected-utility preferences is perfectly possible, but
the Pareto principle implies that group utility must be a linear combination of individual
utilities, by Harsanyis Theorem (Harsanyi 1955). The picture changes under hetero-
geneous beliefs: we can then no longer construct any group expected-utility preferences
which meet the Pareto principle (Mongin 1995). Is this the end of group rationality
under uncertainty? No. Gilboa, Samet and Schmeidler (2004) (GSS) proved the liter-
atures central possibility result: a suitably restricted Pareto principle makes it again
possible to combine expected-utility preferences, but rstly group utility must be a lin-
ear combination of individual utilities and secondly group probability must be a linear
combination of individual probabilities. I call such preference aggregation linear-linear.
Further developments are discussed in Section 3.
Despite its name, Bayesian preference aggregation theory has pursued only a semi-
Bayesian (semi-rational) agenda. It has aimed for the group agent to follow the static
Bayesian norm, setting aside the dynamic Bayesian norm. That is, the group should
be an expected-utility (EU) maximiser, but can violate Bayesrule when information
arrives. The theory is simply silent on the groups revision behaviour; it does not
discipline revision. Bayesian updating is however a cornerstone of classic rationality. A
household or other group which updates its preferences irrationally conicts with our
models, and with our paradigm of rational householdsand, more generally, rational
group agents. Such a group agent displays dynamically incoherent behaviour, and
runs into the very same well-known problems and paradoxes as dynamically incoherent
individuals. It su¤ers preference reversals during dynamic decision problems and games.
It can no longer form and execute stable plans, jeopardizing intertemporal budget
planning. It becomes vulnerable to Dutch books, i.e., engages in sequential betting
behaviour that leads to sure loss. So it can be exploited  by third parties or even
group members.
Linear-linear aggregation creates a statically, but not dynamically rational group
agent, as has been complained (e.g., Mongin and Pivato 2020). How else must prefer-
ences be combined to make the group rational? Two reasons might explain why this
natural problem is open. One is that full group rationality might seem to be an un-
reachable goal, since already static group rationality is so hard to reach. The other
reason is the literatures predominant single-prole approach, which xes preferences
and makes preference change unaddressable.
This paper contributes a theorem that determines which preference aggregation
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rules make the group a rational agent, where for non-triviality that agent must reect
group members, i.e., depend on them in a minimally Paretian and continuous way. The
permissible aggregation rules are the linear-geometric rules, which combine tastes lin-
early and beliefs geometrically. A rst lesson is that full group rationality is non-trivially
possible. This supports the rational-group-agent hypothesis of modelling practice. An-
other lesson is that group rationality requires combining beliefs non-classically (i.e.,
geometrically), but combining tastes classically (i.e., linearly).
The introduction is completed by an example. Thereafter, Section 2 states the
theorem, and Section 3 discusses related literature. The Appendix proves the theorem,
in a generalized version.
Illustration of group-preference change. We reconsider GSSs classic story, but in
a dynamic variant. The story is pure ction, but its structure is typical for real group
agents. The group consists of two gentlemen 1 and 2. They have a dispute and must
decide whether to ght a duel. The outcome of a duel is either that 1 wins (and 2 loses)
or that 2 wins (and 1 loses), depending on a state of nature. There are three states:
 in state s1, 1 is stronger than 2, so would win a duel.
 in state s2, 2 is stronger than 1, so would win a duel.
 in state s3, 2 has a superior weapon (and is equally strong), so would win a duel.
In all states, having no duel has the outcome that nobody wins. Both gentlemen are
fully rational: they hold EU preferences and update them via Bayesrule. We consider
two time points: before and after learning the event E = fs1; s2g that 2 does not have a
superior weapon. Table 1 displays the gentlemens utilities of both outcomes of a duel,
utility of old prob. of old EU new prob. of new EU
1 wins 2 wins s1 s2 s3 of duel s1 s2 s3 of dual
gentleman 1 1 -5 .85 .05 .1 .1 .94 .06 0 .67
gentleman 2 0 1 .15 .15 .7 .85 .5 .5 0 .5
linear-linear group .5 -2 .5 .1 .4 .75 .72 .28 0 .19
linear-geometric group .5 -2 .51 .12 .37 .74 .80 .20 0 .01
Table 1: Tastes, beliefs, and expected utilities before and after learning the event
E = fs1; s2g (numbers are rounded to two decimal digits)
the probabilities of states, and the expected utilities of a duel, before and after learning
E. Note di¤erent things. Each gentleman most prefers winning himself (utility 1).
While gentleman 1 fears dying (utility  5), the reckless and honour-obsessed gentleman
2 does not mind dying (utility 0). Each gentleman initially believes strongly that he
would win a duel, and updates his probabilities rationally via Bayes rule. At each
moment, the gentlemen have conicting utilities and conicting beliefs, yet unanimously
prefer duelling, as duelling gives positive expected utility while not duelling gives zero
expected utility.
Table 1 also displays group utilities, probabilities, and expected utilities, under two
alternative aggregation rules for forming group EU preferences:
 The linear-linear rule denes group utility as the (unweighted) linear average of
individual utilities; and similarly for group probability.
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 The linear-geometric rule denes group utility as the (unweighted) linear average
of individual utilities; but it denes group probability as the (unweighted) geo-
metric average of individual probabilities, normalized to a probability function.
For instance, the old group probability of s3 is k(:1):5(:7):5  0:37, where k is the
normalisation factor 1=[(:85):5(:15):5 + (:05):5(:15):5 + (:1):5(:7):5].
Under both rules, not duelling is initially collectively better than duelling against the
gentlemens unanimous preference. Such Pareto violations have been at the heart of
Bayesian aggregation theory, but this paper instead asks whether the group updates
its preferences rationally. This is not the case under the linear-linear rule: according to
Bayesrule, the new group probabilities of s1 and s2 should have been 0:50:5+0:1  :83 and
0:1
0:5+0:1  :17 rather than :72 and :28, and the new group expected utility of duelling
should have been 0:50:5+0:10:5+
0:1
0:5+0:1( 2)  :08 rather than  0:19. So the group should
have come to prefer duelling. By contrast, under the linear-geometric rule the new
group probabilities and expected utility in Table 1 arise from the old ones via Bayes
rule, as one can check and as our theorem will imply generally. As the new expected
utility of duelling is :01 > 0, the information makes duelling collectively superior (in
our ctional setting which ignores the unacceptability of duels).
The dynamic rationality of linear-linear aggregation cannot be restored by using
weighted linear averages and allowing weights to depend on the preference prole, hence
on information states.3
2 The theorem
We consider a nite set N = f1; : : : ; ng of individuals (forming the group) and a nite
set X of outcomes, where n  2 and jXj  2. Lotteries are probability functions over
outcomes (dened on 2X); they capture objective risk. The set of these lotteries is X .
The probability of an outcome x under a lottery a is a(x) = a(fxg). A utility function
is a function u : X ! R, representing tastes or values. It is normalized if minimal
utility is minx2X u(x) = 0 and maximal utility is maxx2X u(x) = 1. As usual, it is
extended to lotteries by taking expectations: u(a) := Ea(u) for lotteries a 2 X .
To allow for subjective uncertainty, let S be a non-empty nite set of states. Sets
of states are events. We allow the single-state case jSj = 1, but exclude the two-state
case jSj = 2, in which our theorem curiously does not hold.
Choice options are functions a : S ! X (acts), representing the prospect of facing
lottery a(x) in state s. Constant acts are identied with lotteries; they contain no
subjective uncertainty. A preference relation is a binary relation  over acts, formally
  X SX S ; we write  for its asymmetric component (representing strict preference)
and  for its symmetric component (representing indi¤erence). A state s 2 S is null
under  if the outcome at s is irrelevant, i.e., acts that agree on Snfsg are indi¤erent.
A preference relation  has expected-utility type is EUif it maximizes some
expected-utility function, i.e., there are a non-constant utility function u : X ! R and
3Such linear-linear rules with variable weightsstill violate Bayesrule, except if beliefs are combined
dictatorially by concentrating all weight on some individual.
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a probability function p on 2S such that
a  b, Ep(u(a))  Ep(u(b)) for all acts a; b 2 X S :
Here, p is unique, and u is unique if we impose normalization. The unique p and
normalized u are denoted p and u, respectively. Let P be the set of EU preference
relations.
Distributions of tastes, beliefs, or preferences across individuals are captured by
proles. A taste prole is a vector u = (ui) of normalized utility functions of indi-
viduals i 2 N . A belief prole is a vector p = (pi) of probability functions on the set 2S
of events. An EU preference prole is a vector (i) 2 PN of EU preference relations;
it induces a taste prole and a belief prole, given by (ui) and (pi), respectively.
Bayesian aggregation theory usually works with a xed preference prole. To study
preference change, we take a multi-prole approach: we consider an entire domain D of
possible proles. For generality, we allow assume much about D. Formally, a domain
is any set of proles D  PN satisfying two plausible conditions. First, each prole
(i) 2 D is coherent : individuals have mutually consistent beliefs, i.e., at least one state
s 2 S is non-null under each i (i 2 N). Coherence is plausible because presumably
some state in S is trueand hence not excluded by any rational individual.4 Second, D
is closed under belief change: whenever D contains (i) then D also contains all other
coherent proles in PN which di¤er from (i) in beliefs, not in tastes. This assumption
allows us to study belief change.
An EU preference aggregation rule, or simply a rule, is a function F from some
domain D into P, transforming preference proles into group EU preference relations.
Denition 1 A rule F : D ! P is linear-geometric if there exist individual weights
i 2 R and i 2 R+ (i 2 N) where
P
i2N i = 1 such that for each preference prole
(i) 2 D the group preference relation  = F ((i)) has
 u given by
P
i2N iui up to an additive constant,
 pgiven on S by
Q
i2N [pi ]
i up to a multiplicative constant.5
Linear-geometric rules di¤er from classic linear-linearrules, which are denable
analogously, by replacing the second bullet point by p =
P
i2N ipi.
Our key axiom on a rule F : D ! P requires rational revision of group preferences.
A standard rational agent conditionalizes preferences after learning an event. The
conditionalization of a preference relation  on an event E  S is the preference
relation E such that, for all acts a; b, a E b if and only if a0 E b0 for some (and
hence, if  is EU, all) acts a0 and b0 which agree respectively with a and b in the event
E, and agree with one another outside E. Informally, a E b means that a becomes
weakly preferred to b after equalizing (ignoring) outcomes outside E. Conditionalizing
 on E is the right Bayesian response to learning E, because (as long as  is EU and E
4As nobody can possess conclusive evidence against the truth.
5 In the representation of a linear-geometric rule, the belief weights i and the multiplicative constant
are are unique (except in the single-state case jSj = 1, in which beliefs are trivial). The taste weights
i and the additive constant are unique under the diversity condition dened in the appendix.
5
is non-null) it is equivalent to conditionalizing probabilities without changing utilities.
Formally, if  is EU and E is non-null, then E is the unique EU relation such that
pE = p(jE) and uE = u. This is the axiom:
Bayesian Updating: For all preference proles (i); (0i) 2 D and events E  S, if
0i= i;E for all i 2 N , then 0= E (where  = F ((i)) and 0= F ((0i))).
Informally, if information E arrives (i.e., if the prole changes from (i) to (i;E)),
then group preferences are updated rationally. Violation of this axiom makes the group
dynamically incoherent and unable to execute stable plans. This may also create oppor-
tunities to manipulate group preferences and decisions through delaying information.
Recall the standard Pareto indi¤erence axiom:
Pareto: For all proles (i) 2 D and acts a; b 2 X S , if a i b for each i 2 N , then
a  b (where  = F ((i))).
The notorious objection is that unanimities can be spurious: they can rest on
conicting beliefs (Mongin 1997). In the introductory example, the unanimous pref-
erence for duelling is spurious. GSS have thus restricted Pareto to acts which depend
only on events of uncontroversial probability. Formally, given a prole (i), an act a
is common-belief-determined if all individual probability functions pi (i 2 N) agree
on the subalgebra of events induced by a. Here is GSSs axiom, translated into our
Anscombe-Aumann-type framework:
Restricted Pareto: For all proles (i) 2 D and common-belief-determined acts
a; b 2 X S , if a i b for each i 2 N , then a  b (where  = F ((i))).
This axiom excludes directly spurious unanimities, but not indirectly spurious
unanimities. I call a unanimous preference or indi¤erence directly spurious if it is based
on conicting beliefs, and indirectly spurious if it is based on unanimous beliefs which
are themselves based on conicting beliefs. As an example of a unanimity that is only
indirectly spurious, let some individuals unanimously prefer the UK to remain in rather
than leave the EU, based on a unanimous strong belief in the event E that a Brexit
harms the economy (and a unanimous concern for the economy). But let them believe
E for conicting reasons, i.e., conicting beliefs on epistemically prior events: some
strongly believe E because they strongly believe the governments advisers said so (event
E0) and advisors tell the truth (event E00), while others strongly believe E because
they strongly believe the advisers denied E (event E0) and advisors lie (event E00).6 To
also avoid indirectly spurious unanimities, I shall restrict the axiom further, namely
to common-belief proles (i) 2 D, in which every individual i has same probability
function pi . In such proles, not only beliefs underlying the given acts are unanimous,
but also beliefs underlying those beliefs, beliefs underlying beliefs underlying those
beliefs, etc. This excludes spurious unanimities of any order of indirectness. Here is
the axiom I shall use:
6So, some reason from E0 and E00 to E using E0 \E00  E, while others reason from E0 and E00 to
E using E0 \ E00  E.
6
Minimal Pareto: For all common-belief proles (i) 2 D and acts a; b 2 X S , if a i b
for each i 2 N , then a  b (where  = F ((i))).
Remark 1 Minimal Pareto weakens Restricted Pareto, which weakens Pareto.
Our last axiom requires group preferences to depend continuously on individual
preferences, in a standard sense of continuous.7
Continuity: If (1i ); (2i );    ! (i) in D, then F ((1i )); F ((2i ));    ! F ((i)).
I now state the theorem. In the main text I do this only for xed-taste domains, i.e.,
domains D whose proles have same taste prole. This allows variation in beliefs, but
not in tastes. Fixing tastes is perhaps not a great loss, as Bayesian learning changes
beliefs, not tastes; and it is a half-way concession to the xed-prole approach of
standard Bayesian aggregation theory, which xes tastes and beliefs. The appendix
re-states the theorem without xing tastes, and gives the proof.
Theorem 1 An EU preference aggregation rule F : D ! P on a xed-taste domain
D satises Bayesian Updating, Minimal Pareto, and Continuity if and only if it is
linear-geometric.
Two extensions and the uncertainty-free special case are of interest.
Extension 1: non-public information. The axiom of Bayesian Updating covers
publicinformation (observed by everyone). It can be re-stated in two ways, to cover
private information (observed by just one individual) or to cover information of arbit-
rary spread (observed by at least one individual). It su¢ ces to replace the clause if
0i= i;E for all i 2 Nby if 0i= i;E for one (respectively at least one) i 2 N and 0i=
i for all other i 2 N. The two modied axioms are logically stronger: for instance,
the private-information axiom implies the original axiom since public learning of E can
be decomposed into n steps of private learning of E by each individual in turn. The
stronger axioms can still be met, yet by slightly fewer rules. We must exclude rules
that ignore someones beliefs, to avoid that private learning by someone is collectively
ignored. Formally, we can strengthen Bayesian Updating in the theorem in one of the
ways no matter which if we require strict positivity of the belief weights i.
Extension 2: respecting individual tastes. Theorem 1 imposes no constraints
on the sign of the taste weights i. Individual tastes can be ignored (i = 0) or
even counted negatively (i < 0). We can easily enforce existence of non-negative
or even positive taste weights, by strengthen the Minimal Pareto axiom in Theorem
1 in plausible ways. For non-negativity, replace the axioms indi¤erences by weak
7A sequence of pareference relations 1;2;    2 P converges to  2 P written 1;2;    !  
if expected utilities converge, i.e., for all acts a 2 XS , Ep1 (u1(a));Ep2 (u2(a));    ! Ep(u(a)).
This is equivalent to convergence of tastes and beliefs, i.e., u1 ; u2 ;    ! u and p1 ; p2 ;    ! p
(see Lemma 5). A sequence of proles (1i ); (2i );    2 D converges to (i) 2 D written (1i ); (2i
);    ! (i) if for each individual i 2 N , 1i ;2i ;    ! i.
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preferences. For positivity, further add that the groups weak preference becomes strict
whenever some individuals weak preference becomes strict.
Harsanyis Theorem as the uncertainty-free special case. Theorem 1 reduces
to Harsanyis Theorem in the uncertainty-free case, i.e., the single-state case jSj = 1.
This is because in that case acts in X S reduce to lotteries in X (which contain no
subjective uncertainty), the domain D becomes singleton (which amounts to xing the
prole), our Minimal Pareto axiom reduces to Harsanyis Pareto indi¤erence axiom,
and our axioms of Bayesian Updating and Continuity drop out (as they hold trivially
for a single-prole domain). To state Harsanyis Theorem, let an EU preference relation
on X (rather than X S) be a binary relation  on X which maximizes the expectation
of some non-constant utility function u on X; the unique normalized version of u
is denoted u. A group preference relation  on X satises the Pareto indi¤erence
principle w.r.t. individual preference relations i on X (i 2 N) if a  a0 whenever
a i a0 for all i 2 N .
Corollary (Harsanyis Theorem) A group EU preference relation  on X satises
the Pareto indi¤erence principle w.r.t. individual EU preference relations i on X
( i 2 N) if and only if u =
P
i2N iui +  for some i 2 R ( i 2 N) and  2 R.
3 Discussion in relation to the literature
I have proposed to model groups as rational agent in the full sense, by applying to
group agents what we normally require from individuals. Group rationality is uniquely
achieved by linear-geometric aggregation, if group preferences are minimally Pare-
tian and continuous in individual preferences. Linear-geometric aggregation makes the
group agent more rational, but less Paretian, than GSSs classic linear-linear aggrega-
tion a new instance of the classic trade-o¤ between group rationality and Paretianism
(see below). The status of Paretianism under uncertainty is an open debate (see be-
low). Paretianswill nd Minimal Paretianism too undemanding, and criticise linear-
geometric group agents for overruling unanimities even more easily than linear-linear
group agents. Pareto-scepticsnd only non-spurious unanimities worth respecting,
and will like Minimal Paretianism for being safer against spurious unanimities, i.e., for
excluding even indirectly spurious unanimities.
From here, important questions open up. How about weakening static group
Bayesianism into non-EU directions while preserving Bayesian Updating? Such a dy-
namically (not statically) Bayesian approach would be the dual of the statically (not
dynamically) Bayesian programme of Harsanyi, Mongin, and Gilboa-Samet-Schmeidler.
And how about geometric-geometric rules, which pool even utilities geometrically?
Such rules remain fully Bayesian, but become radically non-Paretian.
Bayesian preference aggregation theory was born with Harsanyis spectacular (1955)
theorem: in groups with heterogeneous preferences under risk, group utility must be lin-
ear in individual utilities if the group is Paretian and EU rational. Harsanyi regarded his
result as an economic derivationof philosophical utilitarianism, a controversial thesis
ever since (Weymark 1991, Fleurbaey and Mongin 2016). Harsanyis Theorem enjoys
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some robustness within the limited world of objective uncertainty; see generalizations
by Fleurbaey (2009, 2014) and Danan, Gajdos and Tallon (2015). The picture reverses
for heterogeneous beliefs: EU rationality then becomes incompatible with Paretianism
(e.g., Mongin 1995), and meanwhile Paretianism becomes less compelling because un-
animities can be spurious (Mongin 1997). Gilboa et al. (2004) restore possibility and
rehabilitate Paretianism by restricting the Pareto principle to unanimities that are not
(directly) spurious, obtaining linear-linear group preferences. A lively literature follows,
exploring the trade-o¤ between group rationality in the semi-Bayesian sense setting
aside Bayesrule and Paretianism. The general direction has been to combine more
or less strong group rationality with more or less strong Paretianism, usually working
within some classical model of choice under uncertainty (see Chateauneuf, Cohen and
Ja¤ray 2008 for a review).
Some works emphasize impossibility, often by working with non-EU preferences,
i.e., abandoning even static Bayesianism. In particular, Chambers and Hayashi (2006)
show that full Paretianism already conicts with minimal group rationality, i.e., with
transitive and complete group preferences satisfying Savages P3 or his P4. Another
threat to preference aggregation comes from individual irrationality: Gajdos, Tallon
and Vergnaud (2008) and Zuber (2016) show that, unless individuals have EU prefer-
ences, group preferences cannot even be mildly rational and Paretian also if individuals
have identical beliefs.
Other works stress possibility. For instance, Chambers and Hayashi (2006) show
the possibility of state-dependent fully Paretian group preferences (see already Mongin
1998). Another positive result is due to Danan et al. (2016): incomplete preferences
based on imprecise beliefs can be aggregated in a Paretian way.
Over the years, new Pareto principles have been proposed and defended, such
as principles restricted to unanimities that are shared-belief rationalizable (Gilboa,
Samuelson and Schmeidler 2014), principles sensitive to whether acts depend on object-
ive or subjective uncertainties (Mongin and Pivato 2020), and principles restricted to
unanimities that are common knowledge (Nehring 2004, Chambers and Hayashi 2014).
Attempts to make Paretianism immune to spurious unanimities face a general di¢ -
culty: beliefs become empirically underdetermined once we remove the (unfalsiable)
hypothesis of state-independent utility (Karni 1993, Wakker and Zank 1999, Baccelli
2019). There are di¤erent possible reactions to this intriguing diagnosis, such as: be-
coming more cautious about Pareto axioms out of fearing hidden spurious unanimities,
or on the contrary reverting to full-blown Paretianism out of rejecting the very notion
of belief and spurious unanimity.
The Bayesian Updating axiom is a counterpart for preference aggregation of the
classic External Bayesianity axiom for probability aggregation or opinion pooling
(Madansky 1964). External Bayesianity di¤ers not only in the objects that are revised
and aggregated (i.e., probabilities, not preferences), but also in the notion of informa-
tion, which is given by a likelihood function, not an event. Likelihood functions capture
information outside the domain (algebra) of beliefs the information concept relevant in
Bayesian statistics.8 As is well-known, geometric probability aggregation satises Ex-
8A likelihood function maps states to numbers, representing probabilities of information given states.
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ternal Bayesianity, but there are other well-behaved rules doing so (e.g., Baccelli and
Stewart 2019). By contrast, as shown here, the only well-behaved preference aggrega-
tion rules satisfying Bayesian Updating are geometric in beliefs. As recently shown, the
only opinion pooling rules satisfying a version of External Bayesianity (based on events
rather than likelihood functions) and satisfying two regularity conditions are general-
ized geometric rules, dened like ordinary geometric rules except that the weights need
not sum to one (Russell et al. 2015, Dietrich 2019). A disadvantage of geometric over
linear pooling is its sensitivity to state renement. In fact, already beliefs, tastes and
preferences themselves can be renement-sensitive (e.g., Dietrich 2018).
A Generalisation and proof
The theorem can be extended beyond xed-taste domains. The extended theorem will
make a standard assumption on proles (because of which it is, strictly speaking, not
logically stronger). An EU preference prole (i) satises diversity if for each individual
i there are lotteries a; a0 2 X between which only individual i is non-indi¤erent (i.e.,
a 6i a0 while a j a0 for j 6= i). In the extended theorem, individual weights can vary
with tastes:
Denition 2 A rule F : D ! P is linear-geometric with taste-dependent weights if
there exist individual weights i;u 2 R and i;u 2 R+ (i 2 N) which depend continuously
on the taste prole u 2 f(ui) : (i) 2 Dg, where
P
i2N i;u = 1 for each u, such that
at each prole (i) 2 D the group preference relation  = F ((i)) has
 u given by
P
i2N i;uui up to an additive constant,
 p given on S by
Q
i2N [pi ]
i;u up to a multiplicative constant,
where u denotes the current taste prole (ui).9
Theorem 1+ An EU preference aggregation rule F : D ! P on any domain D of
diverse proles satises Bayesian Updating, Minimal Pareto and Continuity if and
only if it is linear-geometric with taste-dependent weights.
Extensions 1 and 2 apply analogously to Theorem 1+. The domain in Theorem 1+ is
exible. Maximally, it contains all diverse coherent proles (i) 2 PN . Minimally, it is
a xed-taste domain. Theorem 1 is the xed-taste special case of Theorem 1+ (diversity
aside). To see why, note that the taste-prole index u in i;uand i;ucan be dropped
if it is xed. As weights depend on tastes, but not on beliefs, we still have a limited
form of prole-dependence. By contrast, the weights in GSSs linear-linear result can
implicitly vary with both tastes and beliefs. This full form of prole-dependence would
become visible if GSSs result were re-stated in a multi-prole framework.
If states are statistical hypotheses, then statistical information (data) is captured by a likelihood
function, not an event. If states are weather conditions, then the information it rainsis captured by
an event, but the radio forecasts raincould be captured by a likelihood function (which also reects
the reliability of the weather forecast)..
9Footnote 5 about uniqueness of weights generalizes.
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I now prove Theorem 1+. Theorem 1 follows immediately, noting that the proof
needs no diversity assumption for xed-taste domains.
Notation: I write 
P
ifor 
P
i2N, 
S
ifor 
S
i2N, etc. The group relation obtained
by aggregating individual relations is denoted using the same symbol as for individuals,
but without individual index: so I denote F ((i)) by , F ((0i)) by 0, etc. Let
U := f(ui) : (i) 2 Dg be the set of occurring taste proles, and let DCom Bel  D be
the subdomain of common-belief proles in D.
Consider two separate conditions on an aggregation rule F : D ! P:
LIN: There exist real weights (i;u)i2N;u2U such that, at each prole (i) 2 D, u is
given by
P
i i;(uj )
ui up to an additive constant.
GEO: There exist non-negative weights (i;u)i2N;u2U with
P
i i;u = 1 for all u 2 U
such that, at each prole (i) 2 D, p is given on S by
Q
i[pi]
i;(uj) up to a
multiplicative constant.
We prove Theorem 1 by showing four facts, of which the rst three establish su¢ -
ciency of the axioms and the fourth establishes necessity of the axioms:
Fact 1: Bayesian Updating and Minimal Pareto imply LIN.
Fact 2: Bayesian Updating, Minimal Pareto, and Continuity imply GEO.
Fact 3: LIN, GEO and Continuity imply that the rule is linear-geometric with taste-
dependent weights.
Fact 4: All linear-geometric rules with taste-dependent weights satisfy Bayesian Up-
dating, Minimal Pareto, and Continuity.
A.1 Proof of Fact 1
We start with a technical lemma:
Lemma 1 For all (i) 2 D,
T
i supp(pi) 6= ?, and if Bayesian Updating holds thenT
i supp(pi)  supp(p) 
S
i supp(pi).
Proof. Let (i) 2 D. By coherence,
T
i supp(pi) 6= ?. Now assume Bayesian
Updating. We rst show supp(p) 
S
i supp(pi). If E :=
S
i supp(pi), then, i;E=
i for all i; so by Bayesian Updating  = E , whence p = pE . Thus supp(p)  E.
Finally, let s 2 Ti supp(pi); we show s 2 supp(p). Dene E = fsg. The prole
(0)i2N := (i;E)i2N is coherent, hence in D; so by Bayesian Updating 0 = E . Hence
E2 P. Thus s 2 supp(p), as otherwise E would be -null, and E would be the
all-indi¤erent relation, which is not in P. 
We next prove that Bayesian Updating implies this familiar axiom:
Independence of Group Tastes on Individual Beliefs (IGTIB): For all (i); (0i
) 2 D, if ui = u0i for all i 2 N , then u = u0 .
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Lemma 2 Bayesian Updating implies IGTIB.
Proof. Assume Bayesian Updating. Note that if proles (i); (0i) 2 D are Bayes
neighboursin the sense that for some E  S we have (i) = (0i;E) or (i;E) = (0i),
then by Bayesian Updating  = 0E or E= 0, and so u = u0 as conditionalization
preserves tastes.
Now consider any (i); (0i) 2 D such that (ui) = (u0i). By the previous obser-
vation, it su¢ ces to construct a nite sequence of proles in D starting with (i) and
ending with (0i) such that any two adjacent proles are Bayes neighbours. To do so,
pick s 2 Ti supp(pi) and s0 2 supp(p0i) (via Lemma 1). Let (1i ); : : : ; (5i ) be the
ve proles such that (1i ) = (i) and (5i ) = (0i), and such that (2i ), (3i ), (4i )
have taste proles given by u2i = u3i = u4i = ui (i 2 N) and belief proles given
by p2i (s) = 1, p3i (s) = p3i (s
0) = 12 and p4i (s
0) = 1 (i 2 N). These proles belong
to D as D is closed under belief change. To check for Bayes neighbourhood, note that,
for all i 2 N , 1i;fsg= 2i , 2i= 3i;fsg, 3i;fs0g= 4i , and 4i= 5i;fs0g. 
The proof of Fact 1 is completed by two lemmas. The rst uses Harsanyis Theorem
to show that Minimal Pareto alone implies a much weaker linearity property than LIN,
which is restricted to common-belief proles and allows weights to depend arbitrarily on
the prole. The second strengthens the linearity conclusion to LIN by adding IGTIB.
Lemma 3 Under Minimal Pareto, there are weights i;(j) 2 R across i 2 N and
(j) 2 DCom Bel such that, at each (j) 2 DCom Bel, u =
P
i i;(j)ui + c for some
c 2 R.
Proof. Let (j) 2 DCom Bel. Under Minimal Pareto, the restriction of the group
relation to lotteries,  jX , satises Harsanyis (1955) Pareto indi¤erence condition w.r.t.
the restricted individual relations i jX (i 2 N). So our linearity conclusion holds by
Harsanyis Theorem (Harsanyi 1955). 
Lemma 4 IGTIB and Minimal Pareto jointly imply LIN.
Proof. This result follows from Lemma 3, since under IGTIB the linearity conclusion
in Lemma 3 extends to arbitrary proles (i) 2 D (since each (i) 2 D has the same
taste prole as some (0i) 2 DCom Bel), where we can take the weights i;(j) to depend
on (j) only through the taste prole (uj ). 
A.2 Proof of Fact 2
We begin by a simple characterization of preference convergence:
Lemma 5 A sequence k converges to  in P (i.e., Epk (uk(a)) ! Ep(u(a)) for
all a 2 X S) if and only if uk ! u and pk ! p, where ! denotes pointwise
convergence or (equivalently) uniform convergence.
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Proof. Consider k (k = 1; 2; : : : ) and  in P. First, if uk ! u and pk ! p,
then k!  because for all acts a 2 X S
Epk (uk(a)) =
X
s2S
pk(s)
X
x2X
a(s)(x)uk(x)
!
X
s2S
p(s)
X
x2X
a(s)(x)u(x) = Ep(u(a)).
Conversely, assume k! . Then uk ! u since for each x 2 X we can use the
constant act a  x to infer uk(x) = Epk (uk(a)) ! Ep(u(a)) = u(a). Now
we x s 2 S and show pk(s) ! p(s). Pick x; x0 2 X such that u(x) = 1 and
u(x0) = 0, and consider the act a 2 X S mapping s to x and all other states to x0.
Since k! , we have Epk (uk(a))! Ep(u(a)), i.e.,
pk(s)uk(x) + (1  pk(s))uk(x0)! p(s)1 + (1  p(s))0 = p(s):
Since uk(x)! u(x) = 1 and uk(x0)! u(x0) = 0, we can infer pk(s)! p(s). 
Let P = fp 2 (S)N : Ti supp(pi) 6= ?g be the set coherentbelief proles. A
belief aggregation rule is a function  : P ! (S). Consider three conditions on such
a rule:
(C1) Unanimity Preservation: (p; : : : ; p) = p for all p 2 (S).
(C2) Continuity: if pk ! p in (S)N (i.e., pki ! pi for all i 2 N), then (pk)! (p).
(C3) Bayesian Belief Updating: if p 2 P and E  S with p(E) 0, then (p)(E) > 0
and (p(jE)) = (p)(jE). (Here and elsewhere, p(jE) stands for the updated
prole (pi(jE)).)
Our preference aggregation rule F induces a family of belief aggregation rules u :
P ! (S), where u 2 U , dened as follows. Let u 2 U . For each p 2 P, form the
preference prole (i) 2 D with taste prole u and belief prole p, then form the
group relation  = F ((i)), and let u(p) := p. The rules u (u 2 U) inherit several
properties from F :
Lemma 6 (a) If F is continuous, then each u (u 2 U) satises C1.
(b) If F satises Minimal Pareto, then each u (u 2 U) satises C2.
(c) If F satises Bayesian Updating, then each u (u 2 U) satises C3.
Proof. The result is obvious if jSj = 1, as then there is only one belief aggregation
rule, which trivially satises C1-C3. Now suppose jSj 6= 1, and u 2 U .
(a) Assume Minimal Pareto. Let p = (p; :::; p) 2 (S)N be a unanimous belief
prole. Let (i) 2 D be the preference prole with taste prole u and (unanimous)
belief prole p. Form  = F ((i)). We x a state s 2 S and must show that
u(p)(s) = p(s), i.e., that p(s) = p(s). Pick outcomes x; y 2 X such that x  y, i.e.,
u(x) > u(y). Let a be the act which yields x at s and y on Snfsg. Let b be the
constant act which at all states yields the lottery p(s)x + (1  p(s))y. Then ui(a) =
ui(b) for all i 2 N . So, as (i) is a common-belief prole, Minimal Pareto implies a  b.
Hence, u(a) = u(b), i.e., p(s)u(x)+(1 p(s))u(y) = p(s)u(x)+(1 p(s))u(y).
As u(x) > u(y), this implies p(s) = p(s). Q.e.d.
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(b) Assume F is continuous, and pk ! p in (S)N . Let (ki ) (k = 1; 2; :::) and
(i) be the preference proles in D with belief proles pk and p, respectively, and with
same taste prole u. As pk ! p and u ! u, we have (ki ) ! (i) by Lemma 5. So
k!  by Continuity of F , and thus by Lemma 5 pk ! p, i.e., u(pk) ! u(p).
Q.e.d.
(c) Let F satisfy Bayesian Updating. Assume p 2 P and E  S with p(E)  0.
Let (i) have taste prole u and belief prole p. As p(E) 0, each of (i) and (i;E)
is coherent, so in D. By Bayesian Updating, 0= E . Hence, p0 = p(jE), i.e.,
u(p(jE)) = u(p)(jE). 
Given Lemma 6, Fact 2 follows from the following result:
Lemma 7 Each belief aggregation rule  : P ! (S) satisfying C1-C3 is geometric,
i.e., there exist weights i  0 (i 2 N) of sum one such that, for each belief prole
p 2 P, (p) is on S given by Qi[pi]i up to a multiplicative constant.
This result and its proof are variants of results in Buchak et al. (2015) and Dietrich
(2019), who use only slightly di¤erent conditions than C1-C3 and derive a generalized
geometric formula.10 For completeness, we give a self-contained proof here.
Proof. The result is trivial if jSj = 1. So, as jSj 6= 2, we can assume without loss of
generality that jSj  3. Let  : P! (S) satisfy C1-C3.
Claim 1: for all p 2 P and all s; t 2 S, p(s) = p(t) 6= 0) (p)(s) = (p)(t) 6= 0.
Assume p(s) = p(t) 6= 0. For non-triviality, s 6= t. Let E = fs; tg, and let
p0 = (p0; : : : ; p0) be the unanimous prole with p0(s) = p0(t) = 12 . Applying C3 and
then C1, we have (p)(E) 6= 0 and (p)(jE) = (p(jE)) = (p0) = p0. So (p)(s) =
(p)(t) 6= 0. Q.e.d.
Claim 2: For all s 6= t in S there is a unique fs;t : (0;1)N ! (0;1) such that
(p)(s)
(p)(t) = fs;t

pi(s)
pi(t)

for all p 2 P with p(s);p(t) 0.
Let s 6= t in S. Uniqueness holds as each x 2 (0;1)N equals

pi(s)
pi(t)

for a p 2 P.
As for existence, let p;p0 2 P with p(s);p0(t)  0 and

pi(s)
pi(t)

=

p0i(s)
p0i(t)

. We show
(p)(s)
(p)(t) =
(p)0(s)
(p)0(t) . Put E = fs; tg. Note p(jE) = p0(jE). So (p(jE)) = (p0(jE)),
whence by C3 (p)(jE) = (p0)(jE). So (p)(s)(p)(t) = (p)
0(s)
(p)0(t) , where both ratios are well-
dened and non-zero as (p)(s); (p)(t); (p0)(s); (p0)(t) 6= 0 by Lemma 3. Q.e.d.
Claim 3: fs;r(xy) = fs;t(x)ft;r(y) for all x;y 2 (0;1)n and pairwise distinct s; t; r 2 S.
Use that for all x;y 2 (0;1)N and pairwise distinct s; t; r 2 S one can construct a
p 2 P such that x =

pi(s)
pi(t)

, y =

pi(t)
pi(r)

, and so xy =

pi(s)
pi(r)

. Q.e.d.
Claim 4: All fs;t for s 6= t are the same function, to be denoted f .
Let s; s0; t; t0 2 S with s 6= t and s0 6= t0, and x 2 (0;1)N . I must show fs;t(x) =
fs0;t0(x).
10These authors assume C2, C3 and a third condition, and they derive that group beliefs are given
by a generalized geometric formula in which the weights need not sum to one.
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Case 1 : s = s0. Pick p 2 P such that p(t);p(t0)  0 and x =

pi(s)
pi(t)

=

pi(s)
pi(t0)

.
By Lemma ??, (p)(t) = (p)(t0). So (p)(s)(p)(t) =
(p)(s)
(p)(t0) , whence fs;t(x) = fs;t0(x).
Case 2: t = t0. By an argument analogous to that in Case 1, fs;t(x) = fs0;t(x).
Case 3 : s 6= s0 and t 6= t0. I show fs;t(x) = fs0;t0(x) by drawing on Cases 1 and 2. If
s 6= t0, then fs;t(x) = fs;t0(x) = fs0;t0(x): If s0 6= t, then fs;t(x) = fs0;t(x) = fs0;t0(x): If
s = t0 and s0 = t, then, choosing any r 2 Snfs; tg, fs;t(x) = fs;r(x) = ft;r(x) = ft;s(x):
Q.e.d.
Claim 5: f(xy) = f(x)f(y) for all x;y 2 (0;1)N , and f(1) = 1.
The functional equation holds by Claims 3 and 4. The identity f(1) = 1 follows
because f(1) = f(1)f(1). Q.e.d.
Claim 6: (p)(s)(p)(t) = f

pi(s)
pi(t)

for all s; t 2 S and p 2 P with p(s);p(t) 0.
For s 6= t this holds by Claims 2 and 4, while for s = t it holds as (p)(s)(p)(t) = 1 and
as f

pi(s)
pi(t)

= f(1) = 1. Q.e.d.
Claim 7: There exist 1; : : : ; n 2 R such that f(x) = x11   xnn for all x 2 (0;1)N .
The function g : x 7! ln (f((expxi)) on RN obeys Cauchys functional equation
g(x + y) = g(x) + g(y)by Claim 5 and is continuous by C2. So there are i 2 R
(i 2 N) such that g(x) = Pi ixi for all x 2 Rn (Aczél 1966). Hence,
f(x) = exp g ((lnxi)) = exp
X
i
i lnxi = x
1
1   xnn for all x 2 (0;1)N .
Claim 8: Consider the subdomain of full-support proles P := fp 2 P : supp(pi) = S
for all i 2 Ng. For each p 2 P, (p) is on S given by Qi[pi]i up to a multiplicative
constant.
Let p 2 P. Fix any t 2 S, and dene k0 := (p)(t) and k00 := Qi[pi(t)]i . We have
k0; k00 > 0, because supp((p)) = S as by Lemma 1 supp((p))  Ti supp(pi) = S. For
all s 2 S,
(p)(s) = k0
(p)(s)
(p)(t)
= k0f

pi(s)
pi(t)

= k0
Y
i

pi(s)
pi(t)
i
=
k0
k00
Y
i
[pi(s)]
i : Q.e.d.
Claim 9: i  0 for all i 2 N and
P
i i = 1.
We proceed by contradiction. First, assume
P
i i 6= 1. Pick any p 2 P in which
all pi are a same p such that p(s) is neither identical for all s 2 S nor 1 at any s 2 S.
By C1, (p) = p. So by Claim 8, p is proportional to
Q
i p
i = p
P
i i , a contradiction
as
P
i i 6= 1.
Second, assume i 2 N such that i < 0. Pick s 2 S and a sequence p1;p2;    2 P
converging to a p 2 PnP such that supp(pi) = Snfsg while supp(pj) = S for all
j 2 Nnfig. By i < 0 and Claim 8, the sequence (p1); (p2); : : : converges to the
measure assigning probability 1 to s. Meanwhile by C2 the limit must be (p). So
(p)(s) = 1, whence supp((p) = fsg. Yet by Lemma 1 supp((p))  Ti supp(pi) =
Snfsg, a contradiction. Q.e.d.
Claim 10:  coincides with the geometric rule with weights i, i 2 N .
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Note that the geometric rule in question is well-dened by Claim 9. As  and this
geometric rule are two continuous functions on P which by Claim 8 coincide on the
topologically dense subdomain P, the two functions coincide globally. 
A.3 Proof of Fact 3
Assume F : D ! P is continuous and satises LIN and GEO, say w.r.t. weights
(i;u)i2N;u2U and (i;u)i2N;u2U , respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume
that in the single-state case jSj = 1 (in which the geometric weights i;u are arbitrary)
each i;u (i 2 N) is constant in u. By LIN, group utility only depends on the taste
prole. For each taste prole u 2 U , denote the corresponding normalized group utility
function by uu; it equals
P
i i;uui up to an additive constant.
Claim 1 : The mapping u 7! uu on U is continuous.
We assume uk ! u in U and show uuk ! uu. Pick proles (ki ) 2 D (k = 1; 2; :::)
and (i) 2 D with identical belief proles and taste proles uk and u, respectively. By
Lemma 5, ki! i for each i. Hence, by continuity of F , k! . So, again by Lemma
5, uk ! u, i.e., uuk ! uu. Q.e.d.
Claim 2 : The mapping u 7! (i;u) from U to RN is continuous.
Let m := jXj, and label the outcomes in X by x1; : : : ; xm. For each u = (ui) 2 U ,
we identify uu with the column vector (uu(x1); : : : ; uu(xm))T 2 Rm1, which can be
written as Uuau where:
Uu :=
0B@ u1(x1)    un(x1) 1... ... ...
u1(xm)    un(xm) 1
1CA 2 Rm(n+1); au :=
0BBBB@
1;u
...
n;u
cu
1CCCCA 2 R(n+1)1;
with cu dened as the normalization constant such that the minimal entry of Uuau is
zero (so cu =  minx2X
P
i i;uu1(x)). Since uu = Uuau, we have U
T
u uu = U
T
u Uuau,
where UTu is the transpose of Uu. By diversity, the functions ui;u on X (i 2 N) are
a¢ nely independent, and so the columns of Uu are linearly independent. Hence the
square matrix UTu U 2 R(n+1)(n+1) is invertible, whence (UTu Uu) 1UTu uu = au. To see
why the mapping u 7! au = (UTu Uu) 1UTu uu on U is continuous, note that it is the
composition of various continuous functions and operations: u 7! uu is continuous by
Claim 1, u 7! Uu is continuous, and the operations of matrix transposition, matrix
inversion and matrix multiplication are continuous. As u 7! (i;u) is a subfunction of
the continuous function u 7! au, it is itself continuous. Q.e.d.
Claim 3 : The mapping u 7! (i;u) from U to RN is continuous.
If jSj = 1, then u 7! (i;u) is constant, hence continuous. Now assume jSj 6= 1, and
let uk ! u in U . Fix j 2 N . We show j;uk ! j;u. Pick distinct s; s0 2 S. Let (ki )
(k = 1; 2; : : : ) and (i) be the proles in D with taste proles uk and u, respectively,
and with a same belief prole p = (pi)i2N such that pj(s) = 23 and pj(s
0) = 13 while
for i 6= j pi(s) = 13 and pi(s0) = 23 . By Lemma 5 and the fact that uk ! u, we have
(ki ) ! (i). So, by continuity of F , k! , whence by Lemma 5 pk ! p. So, as
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s; s0 2 supp(pk); supp(p) by GEO,
pk (s)
pk (s
0) !
p(s)
p(s0)
. Since
pk(s)
pk(s0)
=
(2=3)

j;uk (1=3)
1 
j;uk
(1=3)

j;uk (2=3)
1 
j;uk
= 2
2
j;uk
 1 and
p(s)
p(s0)
=
(2=3)j;u(1=3)1 j;u
(1=3)j;u(2=3)1 j;u
= 22j;u 1;
it follows that 22j;uk 1 ! 22j;u 1. So, j;uk ! j;u. 
A.4 Proof of Fact 4
Suppose F : D ! P is linear-geometric with taste-dependent weights, say w.r.t. weights
(i;u; i;u)i2N;u2U .
F satises Minimal Pareto: Assume (i) 2 D has common belief pi  p. Then
p = p, as p is proportional on S to
Q
i p
i;u = p
P
i i;u = p where u := (ui). So,
whenever acts a; b satisfy a i b for all i 2 N , then a  b because
Ep(u(a))  Ep(u(b)) = Ep
0@X
i
i;u(ui(a)  ui(b)| {z }
=0
)
1A = 0: Q.e.d.
F satises Continuity : We assume (ki ) ! (i) in D and show k! . For all
i 2 N , uki ! ui and pki ! pi by Lemma 5. Hence (ukj ) ! (uj ), and thus by
continuity of the weights i;(uk
j
) ! i;(uj ) and i;(uk
j
) ! i;(uj ) for all i 2 N . So,X
i
i;(uk
j
)uki !
X
i
i;(uj )
ui and
Y
i
[pki ]
i;(uk
j
)
!
Y
i
[pi ]
i;(uj ) :
Hence pk ! p and pk ! p by denition of F . So k!  by Lemma 5. Q.e.d.
F satises Bayesian Updating: Consider (i); (0i) 2 D and E  S such that
0i= i;E for all i. So (*) u0i = ui for all i, (**) E is non-null under each i
(as otherwise some 0i would be the full-indi¤erence relation, so that (0i) 62 D), and
(***) p0i = pi(jE) for all i. To show that, 0= E , we prove that u0 = u,
E is non-null under , and p0 = p(jE). Write u := (ui) = (u0i). First, by
(*)
P
i i;uui =
P
i i;uu0i , i.e., u = u0 . Second, E is non-null under , i.e.,
supp(p)
T
E 6= ?, because
supp(p)
\
E  [
\
i
supp(pi)]
\
E =
\
i
[supp(pi)
\
E] =
\
i
supp(p0i) 6= ?;
where the holds by Lemma 1 and the 6=holds by coherence of (0i). Third, note
that (****) each p0i is zero on SnE and proportional to pi on S, by (**) and (***). To
show that p0 = p(jE), it su¢ ces to prove that p0 is zero on SnE and proportional
to p on E. This holds because p0 is proportional on S to
Q
i[p0i ]
i;u , which by (****)
is zero on SnE and proportional on E to Qi[pi ]i;u , hence to p. Q.e.d.
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